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ABSTRACT
As a special case of symmetric game in which the players share a common payoff matrix,
evolutionary game provides a suitable approach to model and explore the emergence of coop-
erative behavior in natural and social systems. The evolutionary spatial game (ESG) further
specifies the payoff for each individual by both the payoff matrix M and the spatial dependence
structure of the population on a geophysical domain. Two players game serves as a founda-
tion of modeling various biological/social interactive systems and provides a great amount of
interesting game theoretical models such as prisoner’s dilemma game, snow drift game etc.
We formulate a two players evolutionary spatial game under the framework of initialization,
effective local payoff, and the Markov chain for strategy update. The spatial dependence
structure is modeled by a probability distribution parameterized by the dependence geometry
and strength in the neighborhood of each location. Particularly, we study the structure based on
Gaussian process. Computational methods are proposed and applied to study the convergence
of simulations. In addition, limiting non-local differential equation is introduced and analysed
in terms of spreading speeds and traveling waves.
1CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW
Evolutionary game theory is a model used to understand the dynamics of a population
in a strategic setting. This modeling approach requires a population of individuals, rules of
the game and an interaction structure. Here, rules of the game is given by a fitness/payoff
matrix. On the other hand, interaction rules may vary. It is possible to consider a population
of individuals, for example, with kin selection [43], age structure [8], spatial interaction [33] or
time delay [26]. Dynamical behavior of each structure may be different from each other.
In this study, we mainly focus on the game Prisoner’s Dilemma and the evolution of cooper-
ation played among a population of spatially interacting individuals. Here, we aim to show that
spatial structure gives rise to evolution of cooperation in finite and infinite populations with
long range interactions. Both, simulations of finite population games and their deterministic
limit favors cooperation in some parameter region.
1.1 Game theory
Prisoner’s Dilemma game is one of the best known games in social and life sciences. The
game helps us model cooperative and defective individuals and it has been a rich source of
research since 1950s. The backstory of the game is as follows:
Two people have committed a crime together and have been caught. Criminals I and II
are being held in separate cells and both are offered a deal by the police. They have to decide
what to do independently. Essentially, the deal is this:
• If I confesses and II denies taking part in the crime, I goes free and II goes to prison for
ten years.
• If II confesses and I denies participating in the crime, I goes to prison for ten years and
II goes free.
• If both I and II confess, each will serve six years in prison.
2• If both I and II deny taking part in the crime, each goes to prison for 1 year.
The payoff matrix of this game with column and row players being I and II, respectively, is
given by
Confess Deny
Confess (6,6) (10,0)
Deny (0,10) (1,1)
A rational or selfish player should confess regardless of opponent’s strategy. Thus, confess is
the Nash equilibrium (discussed in section 1.1.1) of this game. However, it is clear that if both
chose to deny, both serve short prison sentences.
Here the strategy ”deny” represents cooperation (C) with the partner and ”confess” repre-
sents defection (D). The modeling approach is realistic and it is not surprising that defection
would be the first choice of rational individuals. Despite this fact, how can we explain that
cooperation arises among individuals, organisms, animals or societies? We seek an answer to
this question in the context of evolutionary game theory. Thus, we consider a population of
individuals playing a two-strategy game on a spatial domain. In the following two sections, a
brief introduction to simultaneous and evolutionary game theories will be provided.
1.1.1 Simultaneous games
Game theory is concerned with situations in which players interact with one another, and
the payoff of each individual depends on both his/her and the opponents’ choice of strategy.
In this section, we consider only the games played by two individuals simultaneously. Thus,
payoffs are given by a payoff matrix M. Suppose both players have the same set of strategies
denoted by S = {si|i = 1, ...n}. Then, the interpretation of mij is the payoff of a player playing
strategy si against the other player with strategy sj . This is the game with pure strategy
players. It is also possible to consider players with mixed strategies. For example a player can
choose to play a certain strategy si with a probability pi. In population games, mixed strategies
naturally arise since a proportion of the population plays a certain strategy.
Mixed strategies are used to define mixed Nash equilibriums. The concept of Nash equi-
librium is useful to analyze simultaneous games. It is also connected to rest points of the
corresponding dynamical system which will be introduced in the next section.
3We define the idea of best response as the best (pure or mixed) strategy of one player, given
information about the strategy choice of the other player. The type of the information depends
on the game played. For example, in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, strategy choices of players
depend on their past. If one trusts his/her opponent, s/he is very likely to cooperate with
him/her. Here we consider the payoff matrix as the only information known by the players.
Therefore, a player searches for the best response to his opponent’s strategy according to the
given information.
To make this precise, introduce the notation. Say s and t are two strategies chosen by player
I and II, respectively. We write Mi(s, t), i = I, II for the payoff of corresponding player. We
say strategy s is a best response to strategy t if s produces as good payoff as any other strategy
paired with t. i.e.
MI(s, t) ≥MI(s−1, t)
for all other strategies s−1 of player I. Now we can define Nash equilibrium.
Definition 1.1.1. We say that the pair of strategies (s, t) is a Nash equilibrium if s is best
response to t and t is best response to s.
This definition is natural for rational players since they respond each strategy to maximize
their benefits. The equilibrium concept is also natural. If the players choose best responses to
each other’s strategy then no one will change his/her strategy.
1.1.2 Evolutionary games
The assumption of rational players in game theory is not needed in population games.
Evolutionary game theory shows that the basic ideas of game theory can be applied to settings
in which individuals can exhibit different forms of behavior such as unconscious choice of
strategy. The theory is mostly applied to evolutionary biology. The idea of Maynard Smith
and Price [49] is that the genes mostly determine the observable characteristic of an organism.
Thus the fitness of an individual depends largely on genes. More fit organisms produce more
offsprings and, hence, these genes dominate the population.
The fitness of an organism is not independent of its environment. Therefore, its interactions
with other organisms have to be considered, which is the reason why we use a game theoretic
framework. Here, an organism’s characteristic and behaviors can be considered as its strategy.
4In addition, its fitness which depends heavily on the strategies of other players can be considered
as the payoff.
Evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) for a population game is another important concept.
Given the game, some Nash equilibriums are evolutionary stable strategies if the population
playing ESS cannot be invaded by small population of mutants. In the next subsection, we will
explain these concept in the language of dynamical systems.
1.1.2.1 Stochastic evolution and its deterministic limit
Consider a population of N individuals playing a game with payoff matrix M and strategy
set S. Here we define the population dynamics as a Markov birth-death chain Xn = (X
i
n)i∈S
where Xin denotes the frequency of individuals playing the strategy i in the population. Suppose
at each time step, an individual is randomly chosen to change his/her strategy. Then, the payoff
of this player is given by pi = (MXn)i. The transition probabilities depend on the payoff matrix
and the state of the population at the current time step. For example, the probability that an
individual with strategy j changes his strategy to i can be given by
P
[
Xin+1 = x
i +
1
N
|Xin = xi
]
=
1
2
+
pi − pj
2∆p
where ∆p denotes the maximum payoff difference. This rule is defined in [53] and is called as
replicator rule, since its mean field equations are the famous replicator equations [20] given by
ρ˙i = ρi
n∑
k=1
milρl −
n∑
k,l=1
mklρiρkρl
where ρi denotes the frequency of individuals playing strategy i. Different probabilities give rise
to different ODE systems. The convergence of trajectories of the Markov chains and ODEs is
justified in [5]. The same result is also valid for continuous time birth-death chains.
Replicator equations constitute the most favorable model in evolutionary game theory, since
its asymptotical behavior characterizes the game itself. In particular, the stable rest point of
the dynamical system corresponds to the Nash equilibriums. The following theorem explains
the relationship between game theory and the above defined ODE.
Theorem 1.1.2. [20] Consider the game with the payoff matrix M and corresponding replicator
equation. Then following are true.
• If x0 is a Nash equilibrium of the game then x0 is a rest point of replicator equation.
5• If x0 is Lyapunov stable then it is a Nash equilibrium of the game.
• If x0 is asymptotically stable rest point of replicator equation then it is an ESS of the
game.
1.2 Overview of this thesis
In the second chapter, we generalize the above defined Markov chain to a lattice population.
Interactions between individuals are modeled by discrete Interaction kernels. Four different
microscopic update rules (transition probabilities) are generalized using non-local interaction
kernels and simulated. Frequency of cooperators are presented as a function of game parameter
and the variance of the kernel. These simulation results suggest that the small variance of
the kernel favors cooperation. In addition these four rules are compared statistically. For a
parameter region including all four biologically important 2×2 games, simulations are repeated
for one microscopic rule. It is conjectured that as the variance gets larger, frequencies obtained
from the simulations converges to mean field equations.
In the third chapter, we introduce the mesoscopic limiting integro-differential equation of
replicator rule using the theory developed in [23]. The basic properties of the equation such
as quasi-monotonicty and linear determinacy are given. Parameter region is identified for
Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Using these properties, existence of traveling wave solutions has
been shown combining the theories developed in [46, 6]. Moreover, the existence uniqueness
and comparison principle is proved in whole parameter space for Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
Using the squeezing technique [2] along with the comparison principle, asymptotic speed of
spread of the non-local equation is studied in the same parameter region. The relationship
between asymptotic speed and traveling wave speed is given. As a result, it is shown that
cooperation is an ESS if the speed of the moving frame is large or small enough.
6CHAPTER 2. SPATIAL GAMES WITH GAUSSIAN STRUCTURES
2.1 Introduction
Emergence of cooperative behavior in natural and social systems is a major challenge in
a variety of scientific disciplines such as biology, sociology or economics [15, 12, 32]. Game
theoretical approaches have been proposed and proven to be suitable and efficient to study
this issue. An evolutionary game model approaches the interactions of individuals in a popu-
lation by a fitness/payoff matrix. In general, the payoff of an individual depends on entries of
the fitness/payoff matrix and the spatial structure of the underline population. This spatial
dependence structure can be modeled by a conditional probability distribution by which an
individual collect information from its neighborhood. Naturally, this structure also influence
the microscopic update rule of strategies, which defines a transition probability of a birth death
process. At each generation, some or all agents may alter their strategies depending on payoff
of each individual in the neighborhood and synchronism or asynchronism of the microscopic
update rules adapted. Transition probabilities are based on the known rules and also depend
on the local payoff in the neighborhood of the individuals under discussion. In this study we
focus on the effects of the spatial structure under different asynchronous update rules.
In many biological systems such as mycobacterium, fungi, plant, and animals, it is natural
to have individual behavior distance dependent. It is, therefore, natural to model the evo-
lutionary games by considering non-uniform interactions among individuals, i.e. interactions
among individuals are functions of displacement or distance between them. Distance depen-
dent weights in modeling network have been studied widely such as in the application of neural
networks. In the context of lattice domain, distance dependent interactions via dispersal or
competition kernels have been studied in seed dispersal [10, 51, 13], and in spread of diseases
[1]. Nonlocal interactions can also be modeled by a variety of kernels with certain biological
applications [9].
Here we propose a model via spatially weighted payoff calculation and interactions on a
7lattice with periodic boundary conditions in the context of evolutionary games. Spatial weights
has been modeled by discrete Gaussian weights and size of the neighborhood depends closely
on the standard deviation of the kernel, which is also the diffusion coefficient in heat kernel.
Individuals collects payoffs from their neighbors according to the weights and the payoff matrix.
We focus on the prisoner’s dilemma game and four widely used microscopic update rules: best
take over (BTO), Moran (M), replicator (R), and Fermi-Dirac (F) update rules. The effect of
the deviation of the kernel on the evolution of cooperation under these rules will be considered
via simulations. These four update rules are compared by using the Latin square design, which
is a classical statistical experimental design to account variations. Moreover, convergence to
the mean-field equation for larger values of the standard deviation will be concluded from the
simulations for general, 2× 2 symmetric games.
The Chapter is organized as the following. In section 2.2, we give some preliminaries to
describe a given kernel and usage of these weights for calculation of payoff values. We also
introduce generalizations of four update rules and connections of these rules with the previous
work. In section 2.3, we consider Prisoner’s Dilemma game and provide comparisons between
simulations of different update rules and uniform and Gaussian kernels. In addition Latin square
method is used to show differences between these rules. In section 2.4, S-T plane simulations
are performed considering different standard deviations of the kernel using one of the update
rules given in section 2.2. Section 2.5 concludes the study and gives future research directions.
2.2 Previous study
Symmetric two players games are the most studied games in evolutionary game theory.
They can be described by the payoff matrix
M =
 R S
T P
 ,
where each component of the M represents the payoff received by the row player against the
column player. Conventionally, the first row player is referred to as the cooperator and the
second one is referred to as the defector.
Simulations of the games can be performed in S − T plane by restricting the parameters
S and T to the intervals −1 < S < 1, 0 < T < 2 and taking R = 1 and P = 0 [45].
The plane regions {(S, T )|S > 0, T < 1}, {(S, T )|S < 0, T > 1}, {(S, T )|S > 0, T > 1},
8and {(S, T )|S < 0, T < 1} corresponds to the Harmony, the Prisoner’s dilemma (PD), the
Snowdrift and the Stag-Hunt games, respectively. In addition, each of the above games can be
represented with one parameter. For the Prisoners Dilemma game, we adopt the one parameter
family given by R = 1, T = b, S = P = 0 due to [35] in section 3.
The classical approach of evolutionary game theory assumes uniform distribution over the
population under consideration. Thus, population is well mixed and dynamic can be modeled
by an ordinary differential equation under large population limits. The most favorable model
is the replicator equation [20] which is the mean field equation of what we call replicator rule.
In addition, the other two probabilistic rules considered in this chapter are Moran and Fermi
rules having different mean field equations, with similar dynamical behavior [53]. In well-mixed
populations, asymptotic density of cooperators are zero for Prisoner’s Dilemma game and 1
for the harmony game. Snow-Drift game and the Stag-Hunt game accept a third equilibrium
point which is stable in the case of the former one and unstable in the case of the later.
More realistic spatial dynamics of evolutionary game theory was first studied by Nowak and
May [36]. They considered the Prisoners Dilemma game using the one parameter family given
above. They showed that cooperation can be maintained in this game on a two dimensional grid
with the nearest neighbor uniform interactions using deterministic update rule called best take
over. The following work of Nowak and May [35] considered synchronous and asynchronous
probabilistic update rules again assuming each player interacts with their immediate neighbors.
Regular grid models are more realistic than the mean field model since the assumption made for
spatial games considers spatial distance dependent interactions. However, regular grid with im-
mediate neighbor interactions does not reflect the effect of long range interactions. Small-world
networks models this property. Evolutionary games on these networks were studied by Shang
et al. [47]. They considered weights as a probability distribution depending on distance be-
tween individuals with the assumption that each individual interacts with a constant number of
player. It is also possible to generalize population structure using graph theoretical arguments.
In general, evolutionary game dynamics on weighted graphs has been studied by Lieberman et
al. [28]. They extended the structure of population considering a non-homogeneous population
on a graph by using Birth-Death and Death -Birth processes described in Outsuki et al. [39].
This structure models different aspects of evolutionary games such as time dependent weights
[7], and updating neighborhoods [27]. Lastly, distance based weights for evolutionary games
via long tailed discrete dispersal kernels have been considered by Muneeperakul et al. [34] on
9river networks.
Above mentioned generalized proportional update rules and pairwise comparison rules will
be adapted to our model in section 2.3. The most commonly used examples of the former
rules are Moran and best takes over rules. The later group includes Fermi rule and replicator
rule. Using these rules, many studies explored the effects of the spatial structure on emergence
and maintenance of cooperation. They concluded that population structure often promotes
cooperative behavior [37] (for exception in the Snow Drift game see [17] on above defined
graph structures.) Effect of neighborhood shape has been studied extensively by Hauert [16]. In
addition, a recent study by Szamado et al. [52] explores the effect of dispersal and neighborhood
size in evolutionary games and concludes that spatially explicit version of evolutionary games
can overcome the exception in the Snow-Drift game. Roca et al. [45] studied influence of above
mentioned probabilistic update rules in S − T plane both on graphs and 2-D lattice.
Thus, it can be seen that there is no rigorous study and comparison of lattice dynamics
for these four rules considering long range interactions. We model long range interactions
using discrete dispersal kernels. Contrary to existing studies, we consider interaction range
and weights as a factor affecting the lattice dynamics in addition to payoff values. This factor
has been measured by the variance of the kernel in consideration. The model set up and
modification of the transition probabilities for these four rules are given in the next section.
2.3 Model development for evolutionary spatial games (ESG)
The ESG is a temporal-spatial process that defines a spatial distribution of population or
strategies on geophysical domain Ω at each time point t. The collection of all individuals at
each location defines a random matrix Zt. This matrix evolves along time with some jumping
distribution P (Zt|Zt−1,Zt−2, · · · ,Z0) which can be either a regular probability distribution or
a degenerate measure. We consider the pure strategy game that each geophysical location is
occupied or adapts only one species or one strategy, i.e Z is a collection of binary random
variables such that Z ∈ {0, 1}|Ω|.
ESG specifies that the jumping distribution is a function of payoff of populations at the
current stage and history. For each location, given the temporal information and spatial neigh-
borhoods, we can compute the payoff of the individual at the location and update its status
accordingly. In this study, we focus on asynchrony rules that one location is updated at each
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time point. We, therefore, refer the jumping distribution as microscopic update rule.
To have a well-defined model of ESG, we need to specify the update rules, the individual
payoff at each location, and Z0. Hence, the modeling of ESG is decomposed into three parts:
initialization, local payoff computation, and microscopic update. Initialization is the step to
specify the initial configuration of the populations geophysically; local interaction is the step of
computing the local effective payoff of the focal location and its relevant neighbors, by which
we apply the microscopic update rule to proceed the game dynamics along time. Step 1 and 2
specify the spatial structure while step 3 defines temporal dynamics relying on some probability
structures (regular or degenerate ones).
2.3.1 Initialization
Initialization specifies the initial configuration (distribution) of the interacting population
spatially at the initial time. In practice, the initial configuration of interacting species for
observational study is always missing variable.However, for the purpose of in silico experiment
the starting time point can always be pre-specified, at which the state of system is reasonable
to be considered as the initial configuration.
On a geophysical domain Ω, the initial configuration is one of the 2|Ω| combinations {0, 1}|Ω|
where 0 and 1 denote defector and cooperator respectively. We denote the initial configuration
by
D0({0, 1}|Ω|) = {Z(s, 0) ∈ {0, 1} | for all s ∈ Ω} (2.3.1)
where location s = (k, l) with k, l ∈ Z+ for lattice model under consideration. It is pointed out
that the equilibrium distribution of the populations may depend on the initial configuration
for certain types of update rules in [36, 35]. This demonstrates that the initial distribution
might have some effects on the equilibrium distributions. To be more specified, we focus on
three interesting initial configurations, where each has some biological implications:
1. well-mixed model: Z(s, 0) ∼ i.i.d. Binary(1/2) which may correspond to hypothetical
initial configuration for observational study or the experimental study of cooperative
organisms like mycobacterium;
2. well separating model: the populations of species (e.g., cooperators and defectors) on Ω
are comparable and are separated by regular curves like straight lines or circles spatially,
11
(a) Well mixed model, empirical frequency of defec-
tor (red one) is 0.4948.
(b) Well separating model, empirical frequency of
defector (red one) is 0.31
(c) Invasion model configuration, empirical fre-
quency of defector (red one) is 0.0392
Figure 2.1 Interesting initial configurations of ESG.
this may correspond to the behavior of immune system and foreign pathogens in chronic
disease such as granuloma in Tuberculosis;
3. invasion model: one of the two populations dominates another one, the introduced at-
tempt to invade the “sea” of the dominating one by one or several small groups while
the contact boundary might be irregular, this may correspond to many ecological case for
newly introduced species (passive or active) such as introducing house finch into North
America in 1940s, and introducing wild European rabbit into Australia in 18th century. It
also can be used to model immunobiological problem such as invasion of bacteria/protozoa
to host or epidemiological problem such as spreading of diseases, etc.
Figure 2.1 demonstrates these three cases with three examples.
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2.3.2 Effective local payoff
Given initial configuration, the classical game dynamics direct each individual or species
occupying certain location/cell on domain/lattice domain to update its status based on its own
fitness and the average fitness related to its payoff. Motivated by [36, 37], the effective payoff for
each individual is not simply the matrix component due to the spatial structure, but a collective
payoff via interacting with all the locations other than itself or its local neighborhoods. Hence,
denote effective payoff of individual at location (k, l) ∈ Ω at time t by pi(Z(k, l, t)), where
Z(k, l, t) ∈ {0, 1} is the type of species or strategy, we have
pi(Z(k, l, t)) =
∫
(k,l)c
M(Z(k, l, t), Z(x, y, t))dµ(x, y) (2.3.2)
for some pairwise payoff function M(·, ·) and σ-finite measure µ.
For ESG defined on the lattice, (2.3.2) can be further specified as
pi(Z(k, l, t)) =
∑
(x,y)∈Nkl
M(Z(k, l, t), Z(x, y, t))Kkl(k, l, x, y) (2.3.3)
where the neighborhood of (k, l) is given by
Nkl = {(i, j) ∈ Ω | ||(k, l)− (i, j)|| ≤ r}. (2.3.4)
Here Kkl(k, l, x, y) is the Radon-Nikodym derivative of µ with respect to the counting measure
restricted on the lattice. M(Z(k, l, t), Z(x, y, t)) gives the value of payoff matrix in accordance
with the strategies Z(k, l, t) and Z(x, y, t) being realized.
In this work, we assume that the procedure of computing effective payoff using K is weakly
stationary. In other words, Kkl(k, l, x, y) depends only on the displacement or distance between
(k, l) and (x, y) so that Kkl(k, l, x, y) = K(k, l, x, y) = K(k − l, x − y) or Kkl(k, l, x, y) =
K(k, l, x, y) = K(|k − x|, |l − y|) where the later case is much stronger by assuming isotropic.
We define K(k, l, x, y) as the information kernel that captures how each location summarize
the information it collects at time step t from its closest neighbor and distant individuals. For
example, if K(k, l, x, y) is uniform [36, 37], i.e.
K(k, l, x, y) =
1
Nkl
the individual at location (k, l) will consider all neighbors equally important; if K(k, l, x, y)
is symmetric like multivariate t-distribution density or multivariate normal density, then, the
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individual at (k, l) collect more information from nearest neighborhood than the further ones
without bias on the direction of contact. If K(k, l, x, y) is asymmetric like multi-dimensional
Gamma distribution density [11], the neighbors may contribute to or influence location (k, l)
in a different way according to the displacement. By using asymmetric kernel, one can also
model the transport process in ESG.
In this study, we particularly focus on K(k, l, x, y) in the form of a Gaussian process for
some spatial dependence structure V , i.e.,
K(k, l, x, y) =
1√
2pi · det(V )exp
(
−1
2
((k − x), (l − y))V −1((k − x), (l − y))′
)
. (2.3.5)
If V is not diagonal matrix, then kernel (2.3.5) also provides asymmetric shape to collect
information.
(a) Kernel K(k, l, x, y) defined by bivariate Gamma
density centering at the location (k, l).
(b) Kernel K(k, l, x, y) defined by bivariate normal
density centering at the location (k, l).
Figure 2.2 Weights assigned to all neighborhoods for the focal (k, l), which are the values of
K(k, l, x, y).
Notice (2.3.5) is nothing but the p.d.f. of the bivariate normal distribution so that V serves
as the covariance matrix where its diagonal components model the variability of the information
collection. On the other hand, (2.3.5) is the heat kernel which provides interpretation of
information collection procedure as a diffusion process. Hence, V models the diffusion coefficient
in heat equation if V is diagonal that one can interpret the information collection as mobility
of the individual as well. Particularly, if V = σ2I, we expect that K approaches to uniform
kernel as σ →∞ and the system is frozen if σ → 0 which results in K approach δ-measure on
each location.
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2.3.3 Microscopic Update Rules
Equipped with (asynchrony) microscopic update rules, the ESG model is a Markov chain
defined on {0, 1}|Ω| that can be described as the following:
Step 1. Uniformly sample location (k, l) on Ω
Step 2. Sample opponent location (x, y) in Nkl for (k, l) using Gaussian process
Step 3. Compute the effective local payoff for each location
Step 4. Compute jumping probability P using quantities from Step 3
Step 5. Update the strategy for location (k, l)
Step 6. Repeat these steps independently
The most commonly used generalized proportional update rules are Moran rule (M) for
n = 1 and Best take over rule (BTO) for n =∞ where
P (Z(k, l, t+ 1) = z(x, y, t)|Z(x, y, t)) =
( ∑
(u,v)∈Nkl
pi(z(u, v, t))K(k, l, u, v)δ{(x,y),(u,v)}
)n
( ∑
(u,v)∈Nkl
pi(z(u, v, t))K(k, l, u, v)
)n
(2.3.6)
Another commonly used family of update rules is pairwise comparison rules which are
completely determined by two locations:
P (Z(k, l, t+ 1) = z(x, y, t)|Z(x, y, t)) = ωF (pi(z(k, l, t))− pi(z(x, y, t))) (2.3.7)
where ω is a normalizing constant. Here F (s) = 1/2 + s/∆s gives replicator rule (R) and
F (s) = [1 + exp(Ts)]−1 gives Fermi rule (F) where ∆s is the maximum payoff difference.
Markov property of the microscopic update rules:
P (Z(k, l, t+ 1) = 1|Ct, Ct−1, · · · , C1)
=P (Z(k, l, t+ 1) = 1|Ct)
=P (Z(k, l, t+ 1) = 1|Z(x, y, t))P ((x, y) is selected|(k, l) is selected)P ((k, l) is selected)
=P (Z(k, l, t+ 1) = 1|Z(x, y, t))
∫
Nkl
K(k, l, u, v)δx,ydµ(u)⊗ dν(v) · 1
N2
=
1
N2
P (Z(k, l, t+ 1) = 1|Z(x, y, t))K(k, l, x, y)
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2.3.4 Summary
In this section, we summarize update rules defined above and connect these rules to previous
studies. Consider a population on a 2D grid and a probability distribution f(||x||) on the plane
where ||.|| is the euclidean norm in the plane and σ denotes the deviation of the distribution.
Spatial weights are basically determined by discretization of the given probability distribution
on the grid Thus weight of the link (i, j) is given by
k(i, j) =
∫ i+0.5
i−0.5
∫ j+0.5
j−0.5
f(||x− y||) dx dy.
In the case of f(||x||) = 1
2piσ2
exp(− ||x||
2σ2
) we get discrete version of Gaussian kernel which can be
represented as a weight matrix and is isothermal due to symmetry of the metric. This definition
of discrete kernel is consistent with the one defined in equation (2.3.5) [48]. In this study, we
use a family of truncated Gaussian Kernels. Here σ measures the effect of distance. As σ goes
to infinity, this effect vanishes and we get uniform distribution on the lattice. If σ goes to zero,
we get Dirac-delta distribution. Thus, the size of the neighborhood closely depends on the
value σ which determines the support of the kernel on the lattice.
We consider an analog of payoff calculation for adaptively weighted networks studied in [7].
An individual i interacts with others depending on the value of σ. Denote the neighborhood
of the individual as Λ(i, σ) = Λ(i). For a given interaction kernel k, the payoff of an individual
can be calculated as
Πi =
∑
j∈Λ(i)
k(i, j)sTi Msj
where sTi = (1, 0) if i uses strategy 1 and s
T
i = (0, 1) if i uses strategy 2.
Next we define four update rules. Moran and Best take over rules are special cases of the
proportional update rules. Thus, let’s start with defining this rule. Let Πi be the payoff of
individual i in the present time step. For a fixed value of σ, neighborhood is given by Λ(i). The
probability that an agent i, with strategy si, imitates its neighbor j, with strategy sj , is given
by
P{si → sj} =
∑
j(k(i, j)Πjδs(i),s(j))
n
(
∑
j∈Λ(i) k(i, j)Πj)n
.
In the case of n = 1, the transition probability is the same as the transition rule defined by
[7]. On the other hand, if we take uniform weights, this rule is exactly the proportional update
rule mentioned above and equivalent to the rule defined by Nowak et al. in [35]. In the case
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of n = 1 we call this rule as generalized Moran rule (M). In addition, generalized best take
over rule (BTO) can be described by the limiting case of this probability as n goes to infinity.
Thus, i adopts the strategy of j, if k(i, j)Πj = maxl∈Λ(i){k(i, l)Πl}. Again in the case of uniform
interaction in a small neighborhood, we get the best takeover rule studied by Nowak [35].
Other two rules are special cases of what we call pairwise comparison rules. One individual is
chosen for reproduction and one of its neighbor is chosen for death. The transition probabilities
of these rules explicitly depend on payoff difference of these two individuals and the distance
between them. Thus, the probability that an agent i, with strategy si, replaces its neighbor j,
with strategy sj , is given by
P{si → sj} = wijF (Πi −Πj).
Here F is a function determining the update rule. As in the classical approach, we call this
rule as Fermi rule if F (s) = [1 + exp(Ts)]−1 and replicator rule if F (s) = 12 +
s
∆s . Here wij is a
function of distance between these individuals. In our simulations, wij is taken as total weight
of sites with the same weights. Thus, in the case of uniform interaction in a neighborhood, we
will get the classical Fermi and replicator rules. For the Fermi rule similar modifications exits.
See the review paper [40] for details, and its applications in learning theory in which wij is
described as strength of influence.
2.4 Study of ESG based on simulation of PD games
We use discrete lattices with individuals at each site. They adopt either cooperation or
defection as their strategies. In our model, individuals can interact with all players in their
neighborhood, the size of which depends on the kernel deviation σ, and collect their payoffs
according to the weights. Since we use asynchronous dynamics at each time step a randomly
selected individual i and its neighbors play the game and i updates his strategy according to
transition rules described above. Here, extended and weighted neighborhood definition helps us
to simulate the dynamics with long range interactions. In the case of Von Neumann and Moore
neighborhoods of classical cellular automata, the kernel is given by uniform distribution in a
small neighborhood. However, it is more realistic to assume interaction or influence between
individuals increases when they are close to each other. The study by [45] considers effect of
Euclidean distance in a network environment, yet they assumed interactions limited to four or
eight neighbors. In this study, we assume interaction range on the lattice determined only by
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the deviation of the kernel. In addition, interactions and information collection are weighted
according to the discretized kernel. In particular, an individual gets more payoff from a close
neighbor than a far away individual and if the distance between two individuals are close they
are more likely to imitate each other. From a mathematical perspective, the probability of
imitating a close neighbor is greater than the probability of imitating a far away neighbor
assuming that both have the same payoff.
In all simulations through the paper, we use 50×50 discrete lattices with periodic boundary
conditions. Initial configurations obtained via randomly initialized population ofN = 2500 sites
adopting one of the possible strategies cooperation or defection. Initially, each site adopts one
of the two strategies with the same probability unless otherwise stated. The links between
individuals are determined by the distance between them via the dispersal kernel. If the
distance between two individuals is greater than r, the weight of this link between them is
taken as 0 where r is the smallest integer greater than 5σ. This assumption is crucial in terms
of computational easiness. In addition, it is also a reasonable assumption since Gaussian kernels
are thin tailed. At every time step, each individual plays the game with others, gathers its
payoff, and using one of four update rules, a chosen individual updates its strategy according
to one or all its neighbors calculated payoffs. We let the system run 2N × 104 step, enough
for convergence of dynamics to stationary mean for σ < 3.5 as shown in the next subsection.
Color maps given in this section describe the population mean in the σ − b or r − b planes for
Gaussian or uniform distributions, respectively.
2.4.1 Convergence of Simulation of ESG
It was proposed that the number of iterations for convergence might be 104N2 in [14]. The
microscopic update rules, however, may differ by the number of iterations for convergence. In
addition, for the games favoring coexistence, no criteria for convergence have been established.
We use sample frequency to capture the first moment of process. Second moment captures
dependence structures of the game, e.g., clustering or random mixed. For each block of 1250
time points, we compute the largest eigenvalue of the sample covariance matrix as an estimator
of the second moment. Time series for the two statistical estimates for replicator and Fermi
rules are shown below.
In this subsection, we use simulations for some parameter values and different update rules
to check the convergence of the Markov processes whose transition probabilities are given by
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the three stochastic update rules defined above. We take the parameter values from the sets
Σ = {1, 2, 3} and B = {1.25, 1.50, 1.75}. For this discrete set of parameters Σ × B, using
Latin square experimental design each update rule is connected to three pair of parameters in
this plane and simulated the games for this parameter values except for the values in reverse
diagonal elements in the following table.
σ/b 1.25 1.50 1.75
1 F R
2 M R
3 M F
History of the processes has been saved to get time series data. To check the stability of
mean, mean density of the population of cooperators is calculated and saved at every 1250 time
steps. In addition, we use approximation of semi-variogram parameters, sill and range again
using 1250 as the windows size.
To construct the covariance matrix, spatial data in each window of size 1250 time steps
has been saved as a vector and the covariance matrix of this resulting 2500 × 1250 matrix is
calculated. The largest eigenvalue of the matrix has been considered as the parameter for the
spatial dependence of individuals.
To study how spatial dependence changes over time and describe spatial variability, we will
consider at and st, range and sill respectively see [44]. Fix the time t and suppose that we
have the configuration Lt at this time. Given two locations si and sj , variogram is defined for
random variables Z(si) and Z(sj) as
2γ(si − sj) = var{Z(si)− Z(sj);∀si, sj ∈ Lt}
and the function γ is called the semi-variogram. We used spherical semi-variogram model to
estimate the parameters at and st. The range at is the distance at which semi-variogram reaches
a maximum. In other words, it is an estimation of the distance h beyond which Z(s+ h) and
Z(s) are no longer correlated. The sill st is the value of the semi-variogram evaluated at any
distance greater than or equal to range. Note also that another parameter for semi-variogram
is nugget. However, in our model nugget has to be chosen as zero since at each node of the
lattice there is just one strategy and γ(0) = 0. It is also a possibility to use spatio-temporal
variogram model to fit the time series data using both space and time lags.
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(a) A realization of time series for Fermi rule with
σ = 3 and b = 1.75
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(b) A realization of time series for Replicator rule
with σ = 1 and b = 1.50
Figure 2.3 Realizations of time series obtained from spatial simulations: Frequency (f), Range
(a), Sill (s) and Eigenvalue (λ).
Figure 2.3 shows the change of time series for mean, range, sill and the largest eigenvalue
of the covariance matrix for some of the above defined discrete set of parameters. These
parameters give information about the first and second moments of the spatial Markov chain.
For example, in spatial PD game, cooperators form clusters. Here, the process at describes the
size of the clusters. For the values of σ and b below the reverse diagonal, we see that density
of the cooperators converges to zero. Thus these results show that the Markov chain converges
in 2N × 104 time steps at most.
2.4.2 Simulations with Gaussian and Uniform Measures
In this section, simulations of Markov chains, described by the update rules, are used to
show the frequency of cooperators for discrete, uniform and Gaussian kernels for PD game. On
one hand, discrete Normal distribution determines distance based weights on the grid. In other
words, discrete Gaussian structure determines the weights as a decreasing function of distances
between cells on the lattice. The weights are controlled with the variance of the kernel σ. On
the other hand, uniform distribution on a neighborhood with radius r gives equal weights to all
cells in the neighborhood. The radius r is the parameter ruling out the size of the neighborhood
in the case of discrete uniform distribution. On the contrary, the parameter σ is not only a
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metric of the neighborhood size but also a metric ruling out the diffusion. This is to say it
describes how strong interactions are in the neighborhood.
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(a) Frequency of cooperators as a function of game
parameter b and the kernel variance σ for Fermi rule
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(b) Frequency of cooperators as a function of game
parameter b and the kernel variance σ for Replicator
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(c) Frequency of cooperators as a function of game
parameter b and the kernel variance σ for Moran
rule
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(d) Frequency of cooperators as a function of game
parameter b and the kernel variance σ for Best Take
Over rule
Figure 2.4 Frequencies of cooperators in σ − b plane
Figure 2.4 shows results obtained for frequency of cooperators in the population for the
update rules, Fermi, Replicator, Moran and Best Take Over rules for random well mixed initial
configuration using Gaussian neighborhood. Effect of the weights described by the parameter
σ shows itself in the case of very small values. It can be seen that the dynamic is freezing for
all rules in this case because the players do not interact with others in the neighborhood due
to non-uniform weights. It can also be seen that there is no significant difference between two
pairwise comparison rules, Fermi and replicator, while Moran rule supports cooperators in a
larger parameter region in b−σ plane. However, best-take over rule shows completely different
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dynamical behavior due to deterministic nature of the rule and the spatial structure. Since
interaction weight of each cell with itself is larger than any other ones in Gaussian neighborhood,
it is unlikely to have larger weighted payoff for neighboring cells. These results are justified in
the next subsection using the statistical method ANOVA.
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(a) Frequency of cooperators as a function of game
parameter b and radius of Moore neighborhood r
for Fermi rule.
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(c) Frequency of cooperators as a function of game
parameter b and radius of Moore neighborhood r
for Moran rule
Figure 2.5 Simulations with uniform measure
All three stochastic update rules are simulated in the case of classical Moore neighborhood
with increasing values of radius r (see Figure 2.5). We consider the radius values r = 1, 2, ..., 10,
since our simulations shows that frequency of cooperators is zero for pairwise comparison rules
in the case of r < 10. Note that a similar study by Outsuki et al. [39] determines the average
number of interaction size on graphs for the existence of cooperators in the case of small selection
parameter. Our main purpose is to show the difference between two kernels in the case of
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enlarging neighborhoods; one with uniform and the other with Gaussian weights. As seen from
Figure 2.5, there is no freezing dynamics for Moore neighborhood supports less cooperation for
all three stochastic rules with uniform interactions. However, the comparison of three rules in
the case of uniform interactions is the same; there is a small difference between two pairwise
comparison rules, Fermi and replicator, while Moran rule supports more cooperators in r − b
plane.
2.4.3 Effects of microscopic update rules
As discussed above, the microscopic update rules govern the dynamics of ESG models.
However, discrepancies across different update rules exist as shown by the above simulation
results (see Figure 2.4 and 2.5 ). This naturally rises the question whether the microscopic
updates rules are significantly different for the purpose of capturing the game equilibriums
accurately. We adapt statistical methods to investigate the repeated numerical simulations as
computer experiments. ANOVA (Analysis of Variance) based on a suitable design of those
computer experiment provides a reliable result for comparison of microscopic update rules.
Intuitively, the best take over rule (BTO) is a sort of deterministic greedy algorithm, which
is expected to differ from the stochastic update rules. On the other hand, BTO is a limiting
scheme of the Moran rule as discussed above. This implies that the Moran rule may possess
potential deviations from replicator rule and Fermi rule.
The four microscopic update rules, from the point of view of experimental design, are treat-
ments operating on the experimental unit which is the initial spatial configurations D0({0, 1}|Ω|)
for each individual based spatial-temporal process. To account the variability of the experiment
as much as possible, Latin square was applied to propose meaningful blocks for the experiments.
For a two players PD game, the parameter b and the standard deviation/dispersal ability σ
define sensible blocks such that varying b from small to large corresponds to nature of the game
in which the defectors vary from mild to aggressive, and varying σ from small to large corre-
sponds to defectors with low mobility to high mobility. In short, effects of b and σ characterize
the nature of the game and their contributions to the variability of game equilibriums should
be accounted by blocking the experiments according to them.
To define a sensible computer experiment, it is necessary to record the responses of the
simulations that can reflect the nature of games. Hence, we recorded meaningful statistics of
the process after long run for individual simulation on fixed σ and b. As discussed before, the
23
equilibrium frequency, that captures the mean of the process and the largest eigenvalue of the
sample covariance matrix from the last 1250 time points, that estimates the dependent structure
are sensible statistics representing the game equilibrium and therefore the game nature. Those
two responses essentially give the first and second moments of the temporal-spatial process
defined by a ESG model. Hence, the computer experiment to be conducted can be summarized
in the following statistical model:
Yijkl = µk + σi + bj + ijl (2.4.1)
for k = 1, 2, 3, 4, i = 1, 2, 3, 4 and j = 1, 2, 3, 4, where µk = (µ
1
k, µ
2
k)
T represent the microscopic
update rules’ effects on equilibrium frequency mean and largest eigenvalue of the sample co-
variance matrix from the last 1250 time points Yijkl = (Y
1
ijkl, Y
2
ijkl)
T , σi and bj represent the
effects of the nature of the games on its own equilibrium while ijl stands for the variation due
to the initial configuration and stochastic simulations. l is the number of simulation conducted
for each experiment with certain update rules and pre-defined blocking choices for the game’s
nature. Statistical model (2.4.1) or the computer experimental design aims to quantify whether
certain update rules are significantly different in terms of the game equilibrium distribution
after accounting the possible effects from the pre-specified game’s nature via σ and b.
The parameter region σ < 1 is not interesting as all stochastic update rules merge with
each other according to Figure 2.4. We focus on the case σ ∈ (1, 3) and b ∈ (1, 2) for which
coexistence equilibriums can be observed from one round of simulation. Parameter values
b = {1.15, 1.40, 1.65, 1.90} and σ = {1.30, 1.80, 2.30, 2.80} are considered for blocks in the
experiments. Four microscopic update rules are assigned within blocks based on Latin square
design with suitable random initialization. The resulting design is shown in Table 2.1. To
σ \ b 1.15 1.40 1.65 1.90
1.30 BTO R F M
1.80 R F M BTO
2.30 F M BTO R
2.80 M BTO R F
Table 2.1 Latin square design of experiment
study how these microscopic update rules differ from each other, we conduct 48 computer
experiments, i.e. 3 runs for each of the above 16 combinations. The experimental unites are
50 × 50 lattice with initial distribution being well mixed with sample mean equal to 0.5. The
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whole data set therefore consists of 48 by 2 responses. At the iteration of 502×104, we perform
statistical test for the two defined responses separately for simplicity (they are not independent
however) based on the ANOVA, for which the results are shown in Table 2.2.
Effects of update rules p-values for frequency p-value for eigenvalue
BTO differs from Moran < 2× 10−16 < 2× 10−16
BTO differs from Fermi < 2× 10−16 < 2× 10−16
BTO differs from Replicator < 2× 10−16 < 2× 10−16
Moran differs from Replicator 0.00284 0.006856
Moran differs from Fermi 0.002535 0.003995
Fermi differs from Replicator 0.967 0.8384
Table 2.2 Comparisons across four update rules based on computer experiments by the Latin
square design
Based on the results in Table 2.2, we conclude that there is a statistically significant dif-
ference between the best take over rule and other three microscopic update rules (p-value
 0.0001); Moran rule is somehow different from Fermi and replicator rules (p-value  0.01);
and Fermi and replicator rules do not demonstrate any statistically significant difference. They
define the same stochastic process and target on the same equilibrium in terms of frequency
and distribution.
2.4.4 Effects of initialization on the game
This subsection is devoted to effect of initial configuration on long run frequencies of stochas-
tic game dynamics. We considered only Fermi rule simulations for PD game using different
initial conditions. We used well-separating and invasion models presented in Figure 2.1. For
the well-separating model initial frequency of cooperators is taken as 0.46 and the long run be-
havior of the dynamics is given in Figure 2.6 (c). Figure 2.6 (a) represents the invasion model
with small islands of cooperators and (b) represents the small island of defectors. Also note
that these results are comparable to Figure 2.4 (a) which is the well mixed model given in
Figure 2.1.
For sufficiently large values of σ, long-run behaviors the dynamics is similar for different
initial configurations including the well-mixed model. The only difference appears in these
simulations for small values of σ. As mentioned earlier, the dynamics is freezing in this case;
individuals at a site does not capable of interacting with individuals at other sites due to weights
dictated by the Gaussian kernel.
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Figure 2.6 Simulations of Fermi rule with initial configurations a) small island of defectors,
b) small island of cooperators, c) well-seperated. See figure 2.1
We conclude that the initial configuration does not effect the long run behavior in the case
of PD game for Fermi rule. By similarity of replicator and Fermi rules, it is expected that this
result is also valid for replicator rule as well. Effect of initial configurations can also be studied
for other two rules.
2.5 S-T Plane Simulations
In this section, we consider all four biologically important games in the parameter space
described in section 2.2. Existing studies use S−T plane simulations to compare the frequencies
of cooperators/defectors for dynamics with different inputs such as different update rules [45],
effect of asynchronism/synchronism [14] or underlying spatial structure (graphs vs regular
lattices) with constant number of neighboring cell assumption [45, 14] in S−T plane. Effect of
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initial condition for all four games has been studied via simulations with small neighborhood
assumption [45]. Moreover, behavior of deterministic dynamics of BTO rule with synchronous
updates gives rise to chaotic behavior and under symmetry condition , Nowak and May reported
existence of evolutionary kaleidoscopes [35, 36]. In short, the usage of these simulations are
mainly used to show the difference between long run behavior of different inputs.
On the contrary, we consider S − T plane simulations to study the effect of interaction
strength and show convergence to mean field equations. Diffusion in the case of regular lattices
and uniform interactions can be seen as neighborhood size whose effect has been studied in [24]
for continuous PD game. The first study considering simulations with different neighborhood
sizes/types via simulations on regular lattices is by Hauert [16]. A more general problem; effect
of the average number of neighbors in a graph on cooperator frequency, is studied in [39]. The
results leads us to cost to benefit ratio for small selection parameter.
A similar question can be asked for our model; how does the variance of dispersal kernel
affect the equilibrium of the game? We answered this question for Fermi (replicator) rule using
simulations by changing the variance of the kernel which is the major parameter that rule out
the interaction strengths for individuals and the neighborhood size. Thus, in this section, our
game is governed by three parameters two of which, T and S, are game parameters and the
third one is the variance of the gaussian σ ruling out the interaction strength and neighborhood
size. S − T plane simulations are performed for different values of σ and it is conjectured that
spatial dynamics of the game converges to mean field equation as σ gets larger. This result
is expected since a Gaussian with very large σ and the support of whole lattice give uniform
distribution on the neighborhood containing all individuals. Thus, as sigma gets larger, the
effect of the spatial structure vanishes. We used the same simulation settings described in the
previous section.
2.5.1 Simulation Results
First, we consider the proportion of the game parameters for which we have coexistence
i.e. Snow-Drift game. Stability results for replicator dynamics in the next subsection shows
that the coexistence region in the parameter space can be given explicitly by 1 > T > 0 and
0 > S > −1. The proportion of the parameters satisfying this inequalities is one fourth of the
whole S − T plane. Thus we consider proportion of coexistence region for spatial simulations
as a function of σ. From the Figure 2.7, it is clear that the proportion of coexisting games
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in the parameter space converges to one fourth which is the proportion of snow-drift game
parameters.
The above result can be extended to be more informative by comparing frequencies of
spatial simulations and the stable rest point of replicator equation for each S and T values.
This will give us a geometric convergence in parameter space. Figure 2.7 shows frequencies
of cooperators as a function of parameters S and T with six different σ values in the left
column and the difference between spatial dynamics and the mean field dynamics in the right.
As seen from the color maps that describe the differences between frequencies of cooperators
in these two dynamics, As σ gets larger, the difference is smaller. Thus, it is clear that the
spatial structure vanishes as sigma gets larger and the spatial dynamics gets closer to the mean
field case asymptotically in the case of finite but large population. Thus, we conjecture that
the spatial frequencies geometrically converge to the rest points of replicator equation in the
parameter region −1 < S < 1, 0 < T < 2. This result can be expressed by the following
conjecture:
Conjecture 2.5.1. The parameter level set of coexistence for two player ESG with fixed σ, Aσ
where σ is as defined in information kernel K and microscopic update rules, is
Aσ :=
{
(S, T ) ∈ (−1, 1)× (0, 2) | lim
n→∞
1
N2
N∑
i,j=1
I{Z(i, j, n, S, T )σ = 1} ∈ (0, 1)
}
where 1
N2
N∑
i,j=1
I{Z(i, j, n, S, T )σ = 1} is the empirical measure of process {Z S,Tn } defined by
ESG at each generation n conditional on the fixed parameter (S, T ) and σ. If the transition
kernel for the process {Z S,Tn } is defined by the pairwise comparison microscopic update rules
as before, then
(1) lim
σ→∞µ(Aσ) = µ(A) (weak convergence)
(2) lim
σ→∞µ(Aσ∆A) = 0 (strong convergence)
where A is the parameter level set of coexistence for mean field model with same payoff matrix
defined by S, T , and µ is the Lebesque measure.
2.5.2 Large populations and proof of conjecture 2.5.1
Stochastic dynamics of well mixed population is studied in the case of finite population
by Benaim and Weibull [5], and this process has fluid limits in the case of large population
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assumptions [5, 53]. As we know, the mean field equation of the replicator rule is replicator
equation [5]. We compared the stable rest points of this equation and the frequency of cooper-
ators in the case of spatial simulations for increasing values of σ. Rest points and the stability
of them is given by following discussion:
Stability of ODE: Without loss of generality take R− T = 1− T = a, P − S = −S = b. The
replicator equation reads as
x˙ = x(1− x)((a+ b)x− b).
Equilibrium points of this equation are given by x1 = 0, x2 = 1 and x3 =
b
a+b if
b
a+b is positive.
If 1 > a > 0 and 1 > b > 0, we have x3 as an equilibrium point. (a+ b)x0 − b > 0 if x0 > ba+b
and (a+ b)x0− b < 0 if x0 < ba+b . Thus, x3 is not stable in this parameter region and the other
two equilibriums are stable. This region corresponds to Stag-Hunt game.
If 0 > a > −1 and 0 > b > −1, we have the third equilibrium again and (a+ b)x0− b < 0 if
x0 >
b
a+b and (a+ b)x0 − b > 0 if x0 < ba+b . This region corresponds to the Snow Drift Game.
In the case of other two regions, there is no third equilibrium. If 0 > a > −1 and 1 > b > 0
(1 > a > 0 and 0 > b > −1), (a + b)x0 − b < 0 ((a + b)x0 − b > 0) respectively, since
0 < x0 < 1. Thus, x1 (x2) is stable in this case and the region corresponds to the Prisoner’s
dilemma (Harmony) game.
Similar results has been obtained for grid populations with non-local interactions in [23]
and chapter 3. The non-local replicator equation with periodic boundary conditions is given
by
ut(x, t) = J
σ ∗ u− u+ (u+ Jσ ∗ u− 2uJσ ∗ u)((a+ b)Jσ ∗ u− b) (2.5.1)
where w Jσ ∗u = ∫R Jσ(‖x−y‖)u(y, t) dy. Suppose the kernel has support Ω and Jσ approaches
uniform distribution 1|Ω| as σ →∞. The quantity measured in the simulations is the frequency
of cooperators in the spatial domain that will be given by p(t) = 1|Ω|
∫
Ω u(x, t) dx Passing the
limit as σ →∞ in equation (2.5.1) gives∫
Ω
ut(x, t) = u− p(t) + (u+ p(t)− 2up(t))((a+ b)p(t)− b)
By integrating the equation (2.5.1) in the spatial variable x, we get∫
Ω
ut(x, t) =
∫
Ω
(
u− p(t) + (u+ p(t)− 2up(t))((a+ b)p(t)− b)) dx
Thus, we obtain replicator ODE stability analysis of which is given above. This implies the
conjecture is true for large population asymptotics.
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2.6 Discussion and Future Work
This paper investigates the effect of non-local interactions on 2-player symmetric spatial
games with a particular emphasis on PD game. Classical evolutionary game theory assumes
random imitation, and classical cellular automata simulations consider local uniform interac-
tions in a neighborhood. Both of these assumptions can be generalized to distance dependent
weights. In the first case, we have a complete graph with uniform weights and in the second the
spatial structure is given by a discrete uniform weight with the assumption that an individual
interacts with a small set of the population. We consider weights as decreasing functions of
distance which is biologically more realistic.
PD-game related results show that Moran rule supports more cooperation. This is also
true for classical cellular automata simulations. In addition, the other generalized proportional
update rule BTO differs from Moran rule and two other pairwise comparison rules. This
is mainly due to the deterministic nature of the rule. Fermi and replicator rules give similar
asymptotic frequencies. ANOVA results also show these two rules are not significantly different
from each other. According to the effect of initial conditions for stochastic rules, the initial
condition does not effect the general picture. The only exception is the case in which the
deviation of the kernel is very small. In other words, if the kernel dictates very small or no
interaction between grid points, the individual at a specific location interact only by itself and
has no chance to imitate other strategies.
S − T plane simulations compare asymptotic frequencies of Fermi rule with those of mean
field dynamics. Similar to the case of classical cellular automata simulations, as the variance of
the kernel, i.e. diffusibility of the individuals on the grid increases, the asymptotic frequencies
of stochastic dynamics gets closer to the stable rest points of the mean field ODE. This result
is proved using the mesoscopic limit of replicator rule.
We considered the spatial dynamics including the self interaction. A biological justification
for the self interaction is given in [38, 35, 17]. It is also possible and computationally easy
to consider stochastic dynamics excluding the self interaction. However, it is not possible to
simulate Generalized proportional update rules using non self-interacting kernels. Thus further
modifications are needed to define these rules properly. For example, we can use two different
kernels one of which is self-interacting while the other is not. The former will be used to define
update rules, the later is for payoff calculation, Some simulation results in [35] were obtained
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by using both self-interacting and non self-interacting uniform distribution on a neighborhood.
It is also possible to simulate the dynamics in the case of synchronous updates. As studied
in [14], effect of asynchronism on asymptotic frequencies of non-local spatial models can also be
studied. Another possibility is to consider BTO in the case of synchronous updates. Clearly,
it will be a completely deterministic update rule. Thus, chaotic behavior for this update rule
and emergence of evolutionary kaleidoscopes can also be studied in the case of symmetric
kernels, see for example Nowak [37]. In addition, effect of initial conditions can be investigated
for synchronous and asynchronous rules. Especially synchronous BTO rule has a potential
to exhibit very complex behavior under different initial conditions. Lastly, different kernels
will lead to different asymptotic behaviors. It is possible to work with specific asymmetric or
symmetric kernels.
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Figure 2.7 Fermi rule simulations in S-T plane. Sigma values changes top to bottom:
σ = 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3, 3.5. Left Column shows frequency of cooperators and right
one shows the difference between left column and stable rest points of replicator
equation.
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           Figure 2.7 (continued)
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CHAPTER 3. NON-LOCAL REPLICATOR EQUATION: TRAVELING
WAVES AND SPREADING SPEEDS
3.1 Introduction
Evolutionary game theory is a basic tool to model emergence and maintenance of coop-
eration in biological and social communities. In a population consisting of cooperative and
defective individuals, cooperators take a cost to assist others, while defectors choose more ra-
tional strategies to maximize one’s own payoff. Thus, cooperation is expected to be rare in the
population. However, cooperation is necessary for major evolutionary transitions in majority of
complex ecosystems, evolution of chromosomes or transition from uni-cellular to multi-cellular
organisms [50]. Game theoretical models provide a systematic way to study and explore this
phenomena. Game theoretical framework models the interactions between individuals playing
different strategies, by a payoff matrix M = (mi,j)n×n and density dependent selection. In the
literature, this interaction is modeled primarily by two games, Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) and
Snowdrift (SD) [4].
In this chapter, we focus on the PD game in which players can make a decision to be
cooperator (C) or defector (D). In the model, cooperation results in a benefit to the opposing
player but defection produces neither cost nor benefit. Thus, fitness of defectors larger than
the cooperators’, implying defection is only Nash equilibrium. Evolutionary stable strategy
(ESS) is a strategy that cannot be invaded by another strategy which is initially rare [4].
In a PD game, the only ESS is D. Evolutionary game theory converts these game theoretic
concepts to the point of view of dynamical systems. Many game dynamics have developed
lately, among which the replicator equation is the most favorable model [20]. The connection
between Nash equilibrium of games and the stable equilibrium of the system is well established
[20]. For PD game, cooperators go extinct, i.e its proportion converges to 0 asymptotically
for any initial condition in (0, 1). Moreover, replicator equation and other equations can be
obtained as deterministic limits of stochastic birth and death processes [5]. Hence, stochastic
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dynamics can be tracked by the deterministic one under large population assumption.
Stochasticity itself is not enough to establish persistence of cooperators in a PD game
because of the asymptotical behavior of its deterministic limiting ODE. In literature, three
approaches exist to overcome this difficulty. The first one is the replicator diffusion equations.
This dynamic approach considers mobil individuals, modeled by diffusion, with same or dif-
ferent diffusion rates [21, 18, 19]. Existence of traveling waves in spatially distributed moving
individuals implies invasion of a defector population by cooperators. The second approach is to
use Markovian cellular automata simulations for populations on grids. Individuals do not move
but collect their payoffs from a small spatial neighborhood. Simulation results also give rise to
persistence of cooperators in a PD game for example see [38] and references therein. The last
approach is to use non-Markovian dynamics. It considers a spatial or well-mixed population of
individuals with memory. In this approach, history of strategies played by each player is saved
and affects the probability of choosing a strategy of another player [41].
We consider a grid population described in [55] with nonlocal interactions. Spatial weights
on the grid are described via discrete kernels. Using the theory developed in [23] and modi-
fying the rate function given in [53], we construct non-local replicator equations directly from
microscopic rules. Resulting integro-differential equation is the deterministic limit of stochastic
grid population which describes the spatial and temporal dynamics of individuals playing an n
strategy game in general.
In this study, we focus on the asymptotic behavior of this equation for the PD game, and
ask what the asymptotic tendency of spread of defectors is. The questions involving spread
and invasion are naturally connected to mathematical theories: traveling waves and asymptotic
speed of spread (hereafter spreading speed). Traveling waves theory is a well known concept
in ecology. Existence of monotone waves implies non-invasibility of cooperators. Existence
of such waves in the case of mobile players has been extensively studied [21, 19]. Spreading
speed was introduced for reaction-diffusion equations in [3] and further it has been applied to
a non-local epidemic model [2] which describes the long term behavior of the population in
spatial habitats. Since then it has been applied to many ecological and epidemic models, for
example see [25, 54].
This chapter is organized as following. In section 3.2, we first give a short description of
the stochastic model and its mesoscopic limits. Then we introduce the modified rate function
and obtain system of non-local replicator equations. In addition, a single equation is derived
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for two strategy games and its parameter region is investigated in terms of quasi-monotonicty,
linear determinacy, monostability and bistability. In section 3.3, existence and non-existence
of traveling wave solutions are established in a parameter region where the non-local equation
is quasi-monotone and linear determinant. In addition, we consider spreading speeds without
linear determinacy condition. It is shown that there exists a unique spread speed and it is
equal to traveling wave speed if linear determinacy condition is satisfied. In section 3.4, we
give technical details of the methods used and proofs of theorems.
3.2 Model derivation
In this section, we present the general spatial stochastic process and its deterministic limit
that has the form of an integro-differential equation. Modifying the transition probabilities for
a non-spatial birth-death process given in [53] gives non-local replicator equations. We then
state the equation for two player games and give some basic properties of the equation.
3.2.1 Stochastic model and Mesoscopic limit
Before stating the limiting integro-differential equations, we recall the underlying stochastic
process on a domain of grid Λ, a subset of Zd. Suppose individuals are located at the sites of
Λ. The interaction strength between individuals at different sites is given by a discrete kernel
J (x´ − y´) satisfying ∑x´ J (x´) = 1. They collect their payoffs from the sites according to the
weight assigned by the kernel and the payoff matrix M = [mij ]. At a fixed time t suppose the
configuration of the lattice is given by β, and β(x´) denotes the strategy played by the individual
at site x´. The payoff of the individual with strategy i at site x´ is given by
p(x´, β, i) =
∑
y´∈Λ
J (x´− y´)miβ(y´)
We assume that each agent has a exponential alarm clock with rate 1 and s/he updates his/her
strategy to i when the configuration is β according to a rate function r(x´, β, i) where x´ ∈ Λ is the
spatial location. This model was proposed in [55] and defined in terms of its Markov generator in
[23] (see also section 3.4.1). Cellular automata simulations with small neighborhood assumption
have been studied by many authors (see for example [36, 35]). Individual based simulations of
this model with Gaussian kernels is considered in the second chapter of this thesis.
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There are several different rate functions presented in [23]. However, we consider rate
functions of the form
r(x´, β, i) = ω(x´, β, i)
[
F (p(x´, β, i)− p(x´, β, β(x´)))] (3.2.1)
where ω(x´, β, i) =
∑
y´∈Λ J (x´−y´)δ(β(y´), i) which is the probability of finding individuals playing
strategy i in the neighborhood of x´ with respect to measure J . We use this form because the
rate functions used to obtain replicator equations have this form. For example, the classical
rate function to obtain replicator equations [20, 5] is given by
ω(x´, β, k)
[
p(x´, β, k)− p(x´, β, β(x´))]
+
(3.2.2)
where [s]+ = max{0, s}.
We now introduce the space scaling. Suppose J(x) is a non-negative and integrable function
satisfying
∫
Rd J(x) = 1. The continuous kernel is a result of mesoscopic scaling, which is closely
related to the discrete kernel J see [23, 42]. The connection between the discrete kernel and
J is given by J γ(x´− y´) = γdJ(γ(x´− y´)) here γ−d = nd = |Λ|. Note that |Λ| is the size of the
population in d dimensional integer lattice Λ.
Suppose A ⊂ Rd is the mesoscopic domain and Aγ = γ−1A∩Zd is the microscopic domain.
Denote the density of agents with strategy i at x ∈ Rd by ui(x). Under this scaling, as γ → 0
microscopic domain approaches the mesoscopic continuum, A and an individual at x interacts
with an increasing number of agents.
It has been shown in [23] that the deterministic limit of this Markov chain is an integro-
differential equation given by
∂
∂t
ui(x, t) =
n∑
k=1
r(x, k, i,u)uk − ui
n∑
k=1
r(x, i, k,u). (3.2.3)
where r(x, k, i,u) is a real valued function describing the strategy change from k to i and
u = (ui(x, t))1×n is the the vector ith component of which denotes the frequency of ith strategist
at spatial position x ∈ Rd and time t ∈ R+. The function r(x, k, i,u) corresponding to the rate
function (3.2.2) is given by
J ∗ ui(x, t)
[ d∑
l=1
(mkl −mil)J ∗ ul
]
+
where J ∗ ui =
∫
Rd J(x− y)ui(y) dy.
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By using this rate function in (3.2.3), Hwang [22] obtained an integro-differential equation.
However, even exploring the parameter space of this equation for basic properties such as
quasi-mononicity or linear determinacy is a difficult task.
3.2.2 Non-local replicator equation
Equation (3.2.3) describes the time and space evolution of the different types of individu-
als/players that evolve according to the rate function c on the domain. Instead of using the
rate function (3.2.2) to obtain non-local replicator equations, we use the following function
obtained from transition probabilities given in [53]
r(x, i, k,u) = J ∗ uk(1 + w
∑n
l=1(mkl −mil)J ∗ ul
∆p
) (3.2.4)
where ∆p is the maximum payoff difference and w is the the intensity of selection restricted to
(0, 1]. The function given above has to be non-negative otherwise corresponding rate function
takes negative values. Using the fact that
∑n
i=1 ui = 1, and rescaling the parameters by
∆p = maxi,k,l |mkl−mil|, we get the restriction on the parameter space maxi,k,l |mkl−mil| ≤ 1
Employing (3.2.4) in (3.2.3) gives the non-local replicator equation
∂
∂t
ui = J ∗ ui− ui +w[(J ∗ ui + ui)
n∑
k=1
milJ ∗ ul −
n∑
k,l=1
mkl(ukJ ∗ ui + uiJ ∗ uk)J ∗ ul]. (3.2.5)
We have the rate function with spatial effects dropped as
r(i, k, ρ) = ρk(1 + w
n∑
l=1
(mkl −mil)ρl.
where mij are rescaled payoffs and ρk denotes the frequency of k
th strategist. Using this rate
in the corollary 4 of [23] or taking J = δ gives the well-known replicator equation
ρ˙i =
2w
∆p
(ρi
n∑
k=1
milρl −
n∑
k,l=1
mklρiρkρl). (3.2.6)
Here J = δ means that individuals at a spatial location do not interact with the other spatial
locations. therefore we get a replicator equation at each spatial location. Equations (3.2.5) and
(3.2.6) shares many common properties. For example any constant solution of (3.2.6) is also
a space homogenous solution of (3.2.5) and vice versa [23]. Moreover, the dynamics depends
only on the payoff differences as seen from the equation (3.2.5).
In section 3.4.1, we provide a technical discussion of the method introduced in [23] and we
present necessary conditions on r(x´, β, i) and r(x, i, k,u).
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3.2.3 Two player games and one dimensional replicator equation
In this section, we present the equation for two player games along with the restrictions on
the parameter space. We consider the payoff matrix a1 a2
0 0
 ,
where |ai| ≤ 1 for i = 1, 2. Using the fact u1 = 1−u2 and the payoff matrix in equation (3.2.5),
we obtain the following single equation:
∂
∂t
u = H[u] := J ∗ u− u+ w(u+ J ∗ u− 2uJ ∗ u)((a1 − a2)J ∗ u+ a2) (3.2.7)
where a1 = m11−m21 and a2 = m12−m22. Using the parameter regions for replicator equations
we can classify this equation as
• Monostable: u = 0 (or 1) is stable equilibrium and there is no interior rest point if
a1 < (>)0 and a2 < (>)0
• Bistable: there exists c ∈ (0, 1) such that c is stable if a1 > 0 and a2 < 0.
We consider this equation in one space dimension with monostable nonlinearity. Note that
the equation is obtained only for bounded regions with periodic and fixed boundary conditions
in [23]. As noted in [42, 23] fixed boundary result can be extended to whole real numbers.
For the sake of simplicity, take b = a2 and a = a1−a2. We state our results for the parameter
region 1 > a > −1 and 1 > b > 0. If we take u(x, t) as the density of defectors at the spatial
position x and time t then this single equation models the PD game.
Linearization (or Fre´chet derivative) of H[u] near 0 is given by
M[u] = −(1− wb)u+ (1 + wb)J ∗ u (3.2.8)
We call an equation linearly determinate if it satisfies the following condition: for each positive
 there is a δ such that
H[u] ≤M[u] and (1− δ)M[u] ≤ H[u] (3.2.9)
when 0 ≤ u ≤ . It is called quasi-monotone if right hand side of the equation (3.2.7) is
increasing function of J ∗ u.
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The non-local replicator equation (3.2.7) is neither quasi-monotone nor linearly determinate
in whole parameter space. The equation is said to be quasi-monotone and linearly determinate,
if the parameter region is restricted to
P1: w(b− a) < 1
P2: a ≤ 0,
respectively. Condition P1 is essential for the comparison principle and it naturally arises
in the proof of theorem 3.3.2. this condition holds for sufficiently small selection parameter,
w. thus it is biologically reasonable assumption. Before stating our assumptions on the
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Figure 3.1 p.d.f of two Gaussian kernels.
interaction kernel J, define the moment generating function:
M(s) =
∫
R
esuJ(u) du.
In this chapter, we assume J satisfies
J1: J ≥ 0 and ∫R J(x) dx = 1
J2: M(s) <∞ whenever s− < s < s+ for some s− < 0 and s+ > 0
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3.3 Analysis of the model
In this section, we consider the nonlocal replicator equation for parameters for which it is
quasi-monotone. Using the comparison principle, we show that asymptotically cooperation is
evolutionary stable if the traveling wave speed is sufficiently large or small. Otherwise, initially
small population of defectors takes over the population.
3.3.1 Existence and Non-Existence of Traveling Waves
In the case of monostable nonlinearity, traveling waves implies defectors cannot invade the
population of cooperators in either negative or positive direction. Existence of such solutions
for evolutionary games with mobil individuals is given in [19, 21]. Here we derive the minimal
speed of traveling wave using the linearized system. We use the theory developed in [46] to
show the existence of traveling waves.
Following [33], we obtain the critical traveling wave speeds by using the linearization
∂
∂t
u =M[u]
and changing the coordinate frame to traveling wave coordinates ξ = x + ct where c is speed
of the traveling wave. Then we obtain,
cU(ξ) = −(1− wb)U(ξ) + (1 + wb)
∫
R
J(ξ − x)U(x) dx. (3.3.1)
Using the exponential ansatz U(z) = e−sz in equation (3.3.1) we get the characteristic equation
∆0c(s) = −cs+ (1 + wb)M(s)− (1− wb).
It is clear that ∆0c is convex and it takes negative values for sufficiently small (large) c and
negative (positive) s. This implies existence of two zeros of ∆0c . In addition, it has double root
for some c±0 . Thus, we can derive the right and left traveling wave speeds by
c+0 = infs>0
−(1− wb) + (1 + wb)M(s)
s
(3.3.2)
c−0 = sup
s<0
−(1− wb) + (1 + wb)M(s)
s
,
respectively. The traveling wave solution u(x, t) = U(x+ ct) of (3.2.7) satisfies the equation
cU ′ = J ∗ U − U + w(U + J ∗ U − 2UJ ∗ U)(aJ ∗ U + b) (3.3.3)
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with boundary conditions
U(−∞) = 0 and U(∞) = 1 for c > c+0
and
U(−∞) = 1 and U(∞) = 0 for c < c−0
Following theorem establishes the existence and non-existence of traveling wave solutions in
terms of traveling wave speeds.
Theorem 3.3.1. Suppose that J satisfies J1-J2, and P1-P2 holds. Then a monotone solution
U of (3.3.3) such that 0 ≤ U ≤ 1 exists only for c 6∈ (c−0 , c+0 ).
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Figure 3.2 Traveling waves. Waves were computed for the game with parameters w = b = 0.5,
a = −0.3 and c=-0.65. Successive waves were separated by 5 time units.
40000−points were used in the spatial domain [−100, 100] and the step size for
spatial domain was 0.005. Time step was chosen as 0.0005. The Cauchy data was
1 on left half of the spatial domain and 0 on the right. (a) shows the existence and
(b) shows non-existence of traveling waves of the game with the parameters given
above.
Theorem 3.3.1 implies the existence of traveling waves, if the speed of the wave is outside of
(c−0 , c
+
0 ). One of the interesting questions is how the variance of the kernel effects the traveling
wave speed. Simulations with symmetric truncated Gaussian kernel with two different variances
show that the length of the interval (c−0 , c
+
0 ) increases with σ, see Figure 3.2.
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3.3.2 Asymptotic Speed of Propagation
In this section we define the asymptotic speed of propagation and show that this speed
actually coincides with the traveling wave speed whenever linear determinacy condition is
satisfied. In addition, asymptotic analysis of (3.2.7) enables us to show invasion of species in a
larger set of parameters than that of traveling waves using the theory developed in [29]. Before
defining the asymptotic speed we state the following theorem which gives the existence and
uniqueness of solutions to equation(3.2.7) and the comparison principle.
Theorem 3.3.2. Assume that J satisfies (J1-2). Then there exists a unique solution u(x, t) ∈
BUC(R × R+) of (3.2.7) such that 0 ≤ u ≤ 1. Moreover, suppose that (P1) holds and for
i = 1, 2, ui is the solution of (3.2.7) corresponding the initial datum ui(x, 0) = u0i,
if 0 ≤ u01 ≤ u02 ≤ 1 then 0 ≤ u1 ≤ u2 ≤ 1
for all (x, t) ∈ R× R+
The condition P1 is essential to prove comparison principle. The proof of above theorem
is given in section 3.4.3,
Since it enables us to write equation (3.2.7) as an integral equation(see section 3.4.4), we
introduce the operator F as
F[u](x, t) = (1 + bw)J ∗ u− 2bwuJ ∗ u+ awJ ∗ u(u+ J ∗ u+−2uJ ∗ u),
then equation (3.2.7) can be written as
∂
∂t
u(x, t) = −(1− bw)u(x, t) + F[u](x, t), (3.3.4)
From now on, we work with a coordinate frame which moves with speed c. For any c > 0 set
ξ = x+ ct. Thus, above equations can be written as
∂
∂t
u(ξ, t) = Qc[u(ξ, t)] (3.3.5)
where Qc[u] = −cuξ − (1− bw)u+ F[u]. The result of theorem 3.3.2 is also valid for (3.3.5), see
proof in section 3.4.3.
The next lemma is an intermediate step necessary to define the spreading speed. It states
that the solution of equation (3.3.5) with a positive initial value converges to 1 in the moving
coordinates for c ∈ (c−0 , c+0 ).
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Lemma 3.3.3. Suppose that J1-J2 and P1 and I ⊂ R be an interval. Then the solution of
the initial value problem
∂
∂t
u = Qc[u]
u(ξ, 0) 6= 0 for ξ ∈ I
satisfies limt→∞ u(ξ, t) = 1 for c ∈ (c−0 , c+0 ).
This lemma is proved using squeezing technique introduced by Aronson [2] and further
developed in [30] in section 3.4.4.1.
Since our equation does not satisfies linear determinacy condition, super solution method
[2, 31] does not work. However It is possible to define right and left spreading speeds as
c+∗ = inf{c ≥ c+0 | limt→∞ u(x+ ct, t) = 1}
c−∗ = sup{c ≤ c−0 | limt→∞ u(x+ ct, t) = 1}
(3.3.6)
In section 3.4.5, we write the equation (3.2.7) as a recursion and show that definition of
spreading speeds is valid.
The following theorem proved in section 3.4.5 gives the asymptotic behavior of the equation
in terms of spreading speed c.
Theorem 3.3.4. Suppose J1-J2 and P1 hold. If the initial data is compactly supported and
0 ∈ (c−0 , c+0 ) then
lim
t→∞u(x+ ct, t) =
 1 if c ∈ (c−∗ , c+∗ )0 if c 6∈ (c−∗ , c+∗ )
Moreover, if a ≤ 0 then c±0 = c±∗ .
Above theorem shows the relation between the traveling wave and the spreading speeds. If
parameter a is negative, then these two speeds are the same and do not depend on the value
of a. Otherwise, spreading speed is always greater than or equal to traveling wave speed. The
effect of a is shown in Figure 3.3. Simulations with two different values of the parameter show
that the spreading speed increases with a.
Here we would like to denote that the quasi-monotonicty condition, P1 cannot be relaxed
unless we assume extra conditions on both the kernel and initial conditions. To prove mono-
tonicity, the condition guarantees the non-negativity of derivative of the right hand side of
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equation (3.2.7) with respect to J ∗ u, see proof of theorem 3.3.2. However, the right hand
side takes its minimum value at u = 1 and J ∗ u = 0. Thus, comparison principle in this case
depends on both initial condition and the kernel.
3.4 Technical details and proofs
3.4.1 Mesoscopic limits
Let S denote the set of strategies. Consider βt as the configuration of the lattice at time
t. Suppose there is an exponential clock of each site and a chosen site x´ updates its strategy
according to the configuration at time t. The generator of this Markov process is then given by
(Lg)(β) =
∑
x´∈Λ
∑
k∈S
r(x´, β, k)(g(βx´,k)− g(β)).
where βx´,k(y´) = k if y´ = x´ and it is β(y´) otherwise. (βx´,k represents the configuration in which
the agent at site x´ switches from his current strategy to a new strategy k.)
Suppose A ⊂ R is the mesoscopic domain and Aγ = γ−1A ∩ Zdis the microscopic domain.
Definition 3.4.1. The empirical measure piγ : SA
γ → P(A× S) is given by
piγ(β) =
1
|Aγ |
∑
x´∈Aγ
δ(γx´,β(x´))
where P(A× S) denotes the set of all probability measures on A× S.
Let βγt be the stochastic process with generator
(Lγg)(β) =
∑
x´∈Aγ
∑
k∈S
rγ(x´, β, k)(g(βx´,k)− g(β))
Assumptions on strategy revision rate rγ(x´, β, k) are that there exists a real valued function
r(x, i, k, pi) where x ∈ A, i, k ∈ S and pi ∈ P(A× S).
R1: r(x, i, k, pi) satisfies
lim
γ→0
sup
x´∈Aγ ,β,k
|rγ(x´, β, k)− r(γx´, β(x), k, piγ(β)| = 0
R2: r(x, i, k, pi) is uniformly bounded i.e there exist an M > 0 such that
sup
x∈A,i,k
|r(x, i, k, pi| ≤M
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R3: r(x, i, k, fm) satisfies Lipchitz condition with respect to x :
sup
x∈A,i,k
|r(x, i, k, u1m)− r(x, i, k, u2m)| ≤ L||u1 − u2||L1
Here m = dx ⊗ di where dx is the Lebesque measure on A and di is the counting measure on
S.
The next result connects the stochastic process with the integro-differential equation.
Theorem 3.4.2. [23] Suppose the rate r satisfies R1-3. Let u be a L∞(A × S) function
satisfying 0 ≤ ui ≤ 1 and
∑
i∈S ui = 1 for all x ∈ A. In addition, assume that the initial
distribution is a family of measures with slowly varying parameter associated to the profile of
u. Then for every T > 0
lim
γ→0
piγt (βt) = u(t, x)m in probability
uniformly for 0 ≤ t ≤ T and u satisfies the following differential equation for x ∈ A, i ∈ S
∂ui
∂t
(x, t) =
∑
k∈S
r(x, k, i,u)uk(x, t)− ui(x, t)
∑
k∈S
r(x, i, k,u)
with initial condition u(x, 0)
The following result can be obtained from the above theorem directly. For the proof of this
corrolary we refer to [5].
Corollary 3.4.3. Suppose that the interaction is uniform with the same assumptions on the
rate c. Assume there exists ρ0 ∈ ∆ such that the initial condition ηn0 satisfies
lim
N→∞
ηN0 = ρ0 in probability
then for every T > 0
lim
N→∞
ηNt = ρi in probability
uniformly for 0 ≤ t ≤ T and f satisfies the following initial value problem:
dρi
dt
=
∑
k∈S
rN (k, i, ρ)ρk(u)− ρi(u)
∑
k∈S
rN (i, k, ρ)
ρ(0) = ρ0i,
where cN (k, i, ρ) = ρi(
∑
l∈Smilρl −
∑
l∈Smklρl).
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3.4.1.1 Replicator rule and replicator equations
The rate given by equation 3.2.1 satisfies above conditions R1-3 if the function F satisfies
global Lipschitz condition [22]. Thus, above theorem can be used to obtain replicator equations
for F (s) = 1 + s∆p . The corresponding function r(x, i, k,u) with this rate is given by equation
3.2.4.
Corollary 3.4.4. Suppose that there is no spatial structure then the rate with F (s) = 1 + s∆p
gives the replicator equation.
Proof. If there is no spatial structure then the rate function can be written as
r(i, k, ρ) = ρk[1 + w(
∑
l
mklρl −
∑
l
milρl)] (3.4.1)
by taking u(x, t) = ρ and using the equality J(x)dx = 1|A| . Applying above corollary gives
dρi
dt
=
∑
k∈S
r(k, i, ρ)ρk − ρi
∑
k∈S
r(i, k, ρ)
=
∑
k∈S
ρi[1 + w(
∑
l
milρl −
∑
l
mklρl)]ρk − ρi
∑
k∈S
ρk[1 + w(
∑
l
mklρl −
∑
l
milρl)]
=
∑
k∈S
ρi[1− w(
∑
l
milρl −
∑
l
mklρl)]ρk − ρiρk[1 + w(
∑
l
mklρl −
∑
l
milρl)]
= 2wρi
∑
k∈S
ρk
∑
l
milρl − 2wρi
∑
k,l
mklρlρk)
= 2w
(
ρi
∑
l
milρl − ρi
∑
k,l
mklρlρk
)
.
By changing the time scale, this gives the replicator equations.
Now we obtain the non-local replicator equations using theorem given in the previous section
and the equality (3.2.4).
∂ui
∂t
=
∑
k∈S
r(x, k, i,u)uk(x, t)− ui(x, t)
∑
k∈S
r(x, i, k,u)
=
∑
k∈S
J ∗ ui[1 + w(
∑
l
milJ ∗ ul −
∑
l
mklJ ∗ ul)]uk
−ui
∑
k∈S
J ∗ uk[1
2
− w(
∑
l
milJ ∗ ul −
∑
l
mklJ ∗ ul)]
=
∑
k∈S
[(ukJ ∗ ui − uiJ ∗ uk)− w(ukJ ∗ ui + uiJ ∗ uk)(
∑
l
mklJ ∗ ul −
∑
l
milJ ∗ ul)]
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We can further simplify this equation using
∑
k∈S uk =
∑
k∈S J ∗ uk = 1. Then, we get
∂ui
∂t
(x, t) = J ∗ ui − ui + w
[
(J ∗ ui + ui)
∑
l∈S
milJ ∗ ul −
∑
k,l∈S
mkl(ukJ ∗ ui + uiJ ∗ uk)J ∗ ul
]
Again if there is no spatial structure then by taking ui(x) = ρi we get
∫
J(x − y)ui(y) dy =
ρi
∫
J(x− y) dy = ρi. Thus, above equation reduces to replicator equation.
3.4.2 Proof of theorem 3.3.1
The following proposition gives the existence of monotone traveling waves that connect two
equilibria of the traveling wave equation (3.3.3).
Proposition 3.4.5. Suppose that J satisfies J1, a ≤ 0 and 1 > w(b− a), then traveling wave
solutions of (3.3.3) exist for c ≥ c0.
Proof. The existence of solutions to (3.3.3) was proved for c > c+0 in [46]. For c < c
−
0 , it is easy
to establish the same results by constructing appropriate sub and super solutions. We prove
the existence of traveling waves for the critical speed c = c+0 following [6]. Suppose cn > c0 be
a sequence of numbers such that cn → c0 as n→∞. Let Un denote the traveling wave solution
of (6) with speed cn. Thus, 0 ≤ Un ≤ 1 and the solution is uniformly bounded by existence of
solutions. Using
∫
R J(y) dy = 1, it is easy to see J ∗ U is uniformly bounded by 1. Using these
bounds, we can obtain
|U ′n| ≤ c−1n (|J ∗ Un|+ |Un|+ wb|Un + J ∗ Un|) ≤ 4c−1n (3.4.2)
Hence, U ′ is also uniformly bounded.
Using Taylor expansion, we have: |Un(s) − Un(t)| = |s − t||U ′n(ν)| for some ν between s and
t. By uniform boundedness of U ′, it follows that Un is equicontinuous for all n. Now, consider
J ∗Un. If |s− t| < δ then |J ∗Un(s)−J ∗Un(t)| ≤
∫
R |Un(s+y)−Un(t+y)|J(y) dy ≤  since Un
is equicontinuous. It is also easy to see equicontinuity of U ′n using the above results. Therefore,
Un, J ∗ Un and U ′n are uniformly bounded and equicontinuous for all n.
Thus, by Arzela-Ascoli theorem, we have a subsequence of Un such that Unk , J ∗ Unk and U ′nk
converges uniformly on every bounded interval. If we denote the limit of Unk by U then U is
differentiable and U ′nk → U ′ Similarly, J ∗ Unk → J ∗ U. Then Taking the limit in (3.3.3) gives
−c0U ′ = J ∗ U − U + w(U + J ∗ U − 2UJ ∗ U)(aJ ∗ U1 + b) as n→∞.
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This implies that U is the solution satisfying equation (3.3.3) with speed c0.
The following result is a direct corollary of theorem 3.3.4.
Corollary 3.4.6. If c ∈ (c−0 , c+0 ), there are no non-constant solutions of equation (3.3.3).
3.4.3 Proof of theorem 3.3.2
Step 1: We work on the space of bounded uniformly continuous functions XT = BUC(R×
[0, T ]) equipped with the norm
||v||T = sup
(x,t)
|v(x, t)|.
For v ∈ XT such that 0 ≤ v ≤ 1, let u be a solution to the following equation:
∂
∂t
u = J ∗ v − u+ w(u+ J ∗ v − 2uJ ∗ v)(aJ ∗ v + b) (3.4.3)
with the initial data
u = u0 on R× {0}.
Clearly, 0 ≤ J ∗ v ≤ 1. If u = 0 at some point (x, t), then ∂u∂t = J ∗ v +wJ ∗ v(bJ ∗ v + a2) ≥ 0.
So the trajectory of u is always beyond 0. It can also be shown that u˙ ≤ 0 when u is 1. Hence,
u ∈ [0, 1]. Existence of such a solution can be proven by the Lipchitz continuity of the right
hand side and Banach fixed point theorem.
Step 2: Let vi, i = 1, 2 be two functions in XT and let ui denote the corresponding solutions
of equation (3.2.7) with the same initial data. Say u = u1− u2 and v = v1− v2 then u satisfies
the equation
∂
∂t
u = Υ1u+ Υ2v (3.4.4)
where Υ1 = −(1 − bw − (aw − 2b)J ∗ v1 + 2aw(J ∗ v)2) and Υ2 = 1 + bw + (aw − 2bw)u2 +
awJ ∗ (v1 + v2)− 2awu2J ∗ (v1 + v2). Integration up to time t yields
u =
∫ t
0 Υ1u ds+
∫ t
0 Υ2v ds
. By taking the absolute value of both sides gives
|u| ≤ ∫ t0 |Υ1||u| ds+ ∫ t0 |Υ2||v| ds
Say Ki = max
uj ,vj∈[0,1]
Υk for i, j, k = 1, 2, then we get
|u| ≤ K1t||u||t +K2t||v||t.
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Taking the supremum over (x, t) ∈ R× [0, T ], we get
||u||T ≤ TK2
1− TK1 ||v||T .
For sufficiently small T, TK21−TK1 < 1. This implies that Tv = u is a contraction mapping. This
guarantees the existence and uniqueness of the solution in [0, T ] and this result can be extended
to larger intervals by continuity.
Step 3: Let ui be the solutions of the equation (3.2.5) corresponding with the initial datum
u0i satisfying the hypotheses of the theorem, set u = u1 − u2. Then we get an equation of the
form (3.4.4) with Υ1 = −(1− bw − (aw − 2b)J ∗ u1 + 2aw(J ∗ u)2) and Υ2 = 1 + bw + (aw −
2bw)J ∗ u2 + awJ ∗ (u1 + u2)− 2awu2J ∗ (u1 + u2). Multiplying this equation by sign+(u) and
using the fact that Υ2 > 0 if P1 holds, we get
u+(x, t) ≤ tK2
1− tK1
∫ t
0
J ∗ u+(x, s) ds ≤ tK2
1− tK1 ||u+||t
Using the same argument as above, for small t, we have tK21−tK1 < 1. It follows that u+ = 0 in
[0, t] since (u01 − u02)+ = 0. This result can be extended to all times by continuity.
3.4.4 Proof of lemma 3.3.4
Consider the characteristic equation
∆c(s) = −cs+ d1M(s)− d2 (3.4.5)
defined on (s−, s+) for d1, d2 > 0. Then, we have ∆
′′
c (s) =
∫
R y
2esyJ(y) dy. This implies
∆c(s) is convex on (0, s
+) and (s−, 0). Thus, for sufficiently large s+ and s−, there exist
two unique points s+0 (d1, d2) < s
+ and s−0 (d1, d2) > s
− such that ∆′c(s
±
0 (d1, d2)) = 0 There-
fore, A(s) := 1s [d1
∫
R J(y)e
sy dy − d2] takes its maximum and minimum values at the points
s∓0 (d1, d2). Moreover, A(s
±
0 ) = c
±
0 (d1, d2). In addition, ∆c is increasing (decreasing) function of
d1 (d2) and is continuous in these parameters as long as M(s) is defined. Suppose d1 ≤ 1 + bw
and d2 ≥ 1− bw, then c±0 (d1, d2)→ c±0 defined in (3.3.2) as d1 → 1 + bw and d2 → 1− bw
Lemma 3.4.7. Let c ∈ (c−0 , c+0 ) be given. Then there exists a function V (ξ) positive on (0, pi/γ)
such that Qc[V (ξ)] ≥ 0 and
Qc[V ] > 0 on (0, pi/γ)
for sufficiently small , γ > 0.
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Proof. Take V0(ξ) = exp(−sξ) sin(γξ) where s ∈ S0 = (−s−0 , s+0 )\{0} and consider the linear
equation ∂u∂t = Lc[u] = uξ + d1J ∗ u− d2u. then Lc[V0](ξ) is given by
[ −cs+ d1
∫
R
J(y)esy cos(γy) dy − d2]V0(ξ)
+ [cγ − d1
∫
R
J(y)esy sin(γy) dy]e−sξ cos(γξ)
Define the functions
A(s, γ) =
1
s
[d1
∫
R
J(y)esy cos(γy) dy − d2] (3.4.6)
B(s, γ) =
d1
γ
[
∫
R
J(y)esy sin(γy) dy] (3.4.7)
We want
A(s, γ) > (<)c if s > (<)0 and c = B(s, γ) (3.4.8)
so that Lc[V0(ξ)] > 0 on (0,
pi
γ ). Denote the limits of these functions by A(s) and B(s) as
γ → 0. Convergence is uniform in any closed and bounded interval of S0. B(s) is increasing and
differentiation of A gives (B(s) − A(s))/s. By assumptions, it is clear that A(s) > (<) B(s)
on (0, s+0 ) ( on (s
−
0 , 0)). Thus, A is decreasing for 0 < s < s
+
0 (d1, d2) and s
−
0 (d1, d2) < s < 0.
And clearly B(s) is increasing on S0. Moreover, B(s
±
0 (d1, d2)) = c
±
0 (d1, d2) = A(s
±
0 ) implying
B(0) ∈ (c−0 , c+0 ). Thus, for any δ > 0 and arbitrarily chosen c ∈ (c−0 (d1, d2), B(0)) we have
B(s1) + δ < c < B(s2)− δ
for sufficiently small γ and appropriately chosen s1 and s2. Thus there exist a s(γ) such that
B(s(γ), γ) = c. Clearly A′(s) is negative and it implies B(s) < A(s). Choose γ small enough to
get c = B(s(γ), γ) < A(s(γ), γ) so that (3.4.8) is satisfied. This implies Lc[V0] > 0 in (0, pi/γ).
Define
V (ξ) =
 V0(ξ) if ξ ∈ (0, pi/γ)0 if ξ 6∈ (0, pi/γ)
By lemma 2 of [2], it follows that Lc[V ] > 0 on ξ ∈ (0, pi/γ). Now, show Qc(V0) is positive on
(0, pi/γ). Choose two positive numbers ε1, ε2 small enough such that for any c ∈ (c−0 , c+0 ), c is also
in (c−0 (d1, d2), c
+
0 (d1, d2) where (d1, d2) = (1 + cw− ε1, 1− bw+ ε2) due to continuity of (3.4.5).
Then we can choose  small enough to get Qc(V0)−Lc(V0) > 0. Thus, Qc(V ) > Lc(V ) > 0
on (0, pi/γ). Qc(V0) ≥ 0 follows from theorem 3.3.2 and above discussion.
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Suppose u is the solution of (3.3.4) and (3.3.5) with given initial data u˜0, we can write these
equations in the following integral form:
u(x, t) = u0(x)e
−(1−bw)t +
∫ t
0
e−(1−bw)(t−s)F(u, J ∗ u)(x, s) ds (3.4.9)
and
u(ξ, t) = u0(ξ − ct)e−(1−bw)t +
∫ t
0
e−(1−bw)(t−s)F(u, J ∗ u)(ξ − c(t− s), s) ds (3.4.10)
.
Proposition 3.4.8. Suppose J1-J2 and P1 hold. Then, the solution of the initial value
problem
∂
∂t
u = Qc[u]
u(ξ, 0) = V
satisfies limt→∞ u(ξ, t) = 1 for c ∈ (c−0 , c+0 ).
Proof. By theorem 3.3.2, u(ξ, t) ≤ 1. Therefore, the limit limt→∞ u(ξ, t) = q(ξ) exists. Define
a new variable of integration θ = ξ + c(t− τ) to get
u(ξ, t) = V0(ξ− ct)e−(1−bw)t + 1
c
∫ ∞
ξ
e
1−bw
c
(ξ−θ)I[ξ,ξ+ct]F(u, J ∗ u)(θ, t−
1
c
(θ− ξ)) dθ. (3.4.11)
where I denotes the indicator function. taking the limit as t→∞ gives the equation
q(ξ) =
1
c
∫ ∞
0
e
1−bw
c
(ξ−θ)F(q, J ∗ q)(θ) dθ. (3.4.12)
Taking the derivative gives
q′ =
1− bw
c
q +
1
c
F(q, J ∗ q)
which is the steady state equation of (3.2.7). Moreover, this equation has the form of (3.3.3)
having two constant solutions, 0 and 1. By above lemma, it is easy to conclude that q(ξ) > V
in [0, pi/γ]. In addition, proposition 1 of [2] states that q > 0. Using continuity of q concludes
that q(ξ + h) > V in [0, pi/γ] and q(ξ + h) ≥ V in R for sufficiently small h. We see that
q(ξ+h) ≥ q(ξ) in [0, pi/γ] for small enough h ∈ R by comparison principle. This implies q′ = 0
so q is a constant. q has to be 1 since q > 0 in (0, pi/γ).
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3.4.4.1 Proof of lemma 3.3.3
Let W be the solution of the initial value problem given in lemma 3.3.3. By proposition 1
of [2], there exists a time T > 0 such that
min{W (ξ, T )|0 ≤ ξ < pi
γ
} = m > 0.
Choose  small enough such that V ≤ m in [0, pi/γ]. Suppose u(ξ, t) is the corresponding initial
value problem as in proposition 3.4.8. Then u(ξ, 0) ≤W (ξ, T ). It follows from the comparison
lemma that u(ξ, t− T ) ≤W (ξ, t) for all t. Since u(ξ,∞) = 1, W (ξ,∞) = 1
3.4.5 Proof of theorem 3.3.4
First, we show that the spreading speeds defined in (3.3.6) are finite. To this extend, we
need following definition:
Definition 3.4.9. (sub and super-solutions) Consider the equation ut = f(u, J ∗u). A function
ω = u¯ (u) ∈ BUC(R × R+) is said to be a super(sub)-solution of the equation if it has left
partial derivative with respect to t such that
∂ω
∂t− ≥ (≤)f(ω, J ∗ ω)
Proposition 3.4.10. Spreading speeds defined in (3.3.6) are finite.
Proof. The solution to equation (3.2.7) takes values in between 0 and 1. Thus, we can find two
numbers d1 and d2 such that H[u] ≤ d1u+ d2J ∗ u. For these values of di, we get the roots of
the characteristic equation (3.4.5) as c± := c±0 (d1, d2) It is easy to verify that the function
ω(x, t) = min{1,Kex+c±t}
is a super-solution of the equation (3.2.7). Suppose u0 is the initial condition of the equation
with compact support. Choose K such that 0 ≤ u0(x) ≤ ω(x, 0), then by comparison principle
u(ξ, t) ≤ ω(ξ, t)→ 0 as t→∞ for |c| ≥ c±. This implies c+∗ ≤ c+ and c−∗ ≥ c−.
Now we need to show that c±∗ are spreading speeds. It is clear,by definition, that limt→0 u(x+
ct, t) = 1 if c ∈ (c−∗ , c+∗ ) and limt→0 u(x+ ct, t) 6= 1 otherwise. Denote the solution to equation
(3.2.7) as un(x) = u(x, n) for n ∈ N. Then un satisfies the recursion
un(x) = Q[un−1](x)
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Clearly, we get the order preserving property for this operator as a result of comparison prin-
ciple. In addition, the operator is translation invariant i.e Ty[Q[u]] = Q[Ty[u]] for any y ∈ R.
We refer the proof of Lemma 3.1 given in [54] to prove the continuity of the operator.
Moreover, Q(n)[α]→ 1 as n→∞ for any 0 < α < 1 by lemma 3.3.3 and the hypothesis of
the theorem 0 ∈ (c−0 .c+0 ).
Thus, we see that limu(x+ ct, t) = 0 or 1 by theorems 3.1 and 3.2 in [29].
The last statement c±0 = c
±∗ follows from the fact that if a < 0 then H[u] ≤ M[u]. This
allows us to choose d1 = 1 + bw and d2 = −1 + bw in proposition 3.4.10. Combining this with
lemma 3.3.3 gives the desired result.
54
1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.50
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
u
t=0
t=5
t=10
t=15
t=20
t=25
x
(a) Spread of defectors for a = 0.999
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(b) Cooperators take over the population for a = 0
Figure 3.3 Asymptotic behavior of defectors for the game with parameters w = 1, b = 0.1,
σ = 0.1 and c = 0.095 is shown. Successive solutions are separated by 5 time
units. 40000− points were used in the spatial domain [−40, 40] and the step size
for spatial domain was 0.002. Time step was chosen as 0.0005. The initial condition
is the blue curve shown in the figure with support [−2.5, 2.5].
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